Angriff auf die Lieferkette

[root_s2yse8vt]

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Es sieht so aus, als hätte jemand seine eigene Firmware installiert und sie dann in der Lieferkette weitergegeben, damit sie genau wie jede andere Trezor verpackt wird. Beängstigend.

Wie können wir uns als Verbraucher davor schützen?

[https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/fake-trezor-hardware-crypto-wallet/48155/](https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/fake-trezor-hardware-crypto-wallet/48155/)

[brianddk]

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> How do we protect against this as a consumer?

Simple. Install firmware

> All Trezor devices are distributed without firmware installed – you will need to install it during setup. This setup process will check if firmware is already installed on the device. If firmware is detected then the device should not be used.

– ***[Trezor Online Manual](https://trezor.io/learn/a/authenticate-trezor-model-t)***

As the article clearly states. Once you install firmware you get the red ***UNSAFE*** boot screen. This is your indication to throw it away. What’s more, Trezor always (AFAIK) ship with OLD bootloaders, so you can verify that your firmware flash upon unboxing increments the bootloader version. Once you get off the hacked bootloader all the warnings would be re-enabled and you’d know you bought junk.

[simonmales]

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The article says it exactly:

> The main safeguard is to buy your wallet directly from the official vendor

Also Trezor has shared information about this attack in May 2022.

[https://blog.trezor.io/stay-safe-shopping-for-hardware-wallets-543f144e3d24](https://blog.trezor.io/stay-safe-shopping-for-hardware-wallets-543f144e3d24)

[MikalaMikala]

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Scary! Does this mean, that if one is able to set up a passphrase, then the Trezor is legit?

[DefiantAbalone1]

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Has this ever happened with trezor one units?

[Autor]

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