Nur um mich zu beruhigen. Ich bin auf die Microsoft-App-Seed-Phrase hereingefallen. Ich habe mein Hauptbuch zurückgesetzt, indem ich 3 falsche Pins eingegeben habe. Ich habe meinen Seed komplett offline gespeichert. Gesendet eine kleine Menge von Krypto zu meinem Ledger live. Bevor ich den großen Schritt machen. mein Ledger ist sicher richtig? Ich weiß, dass meine Dummheit es verursacht hat :) Lektion gelernt

[root_s2yse8vt]

Up

0

Down

::

Nur um mich zu beruhigen. Ich bin auf die Microsoft App Seed Phrase hereingefallen. Ich habe mein Ledger durch die Eingabe von 3 falschen Pins zurückgesetzt. Gesichert mein Seed komplett offline . Gesendet eine kleine Menge von Krypto zu meinem Ledger live. Bevor ich den großen Schritt machen. mein Ledger ist sicher richtig? Ich weiß, dass meine Dummheit es verursacht hat 🙂 Lektion gelernt

[kilianv3]

Up

0

Down

::

I don’t understand what you did. Did you expose your seed phrase? Then the account with the exposed seed phrase is very insecure. If you created a new seed phrase the account with the new seed phrase is secure.

[Yodel_And_Hodl_Mode]

Up

0

Down

::

The issue isn’t whether your Ledger is safe. Your Ledger is always safe unless you somehow let people know your PIN code.

So, the real question is this: Is Your Seed Safe?

You said:

> I’ve reset my ledger by inputting 3 wrong pins. Saved my seed completely offline

…but did you start over with a brand new seed, or did you use your old seed? Your old seed is what was compromised. So, if you started over by letting your Ledger create a new seed, you’re good. But if you restored your old seed, you’re screwed (because your old seed is screwed).

[crypt0kiddie]

Up

0

Down

::

None of what you said made any sense.

You understand that your cryptocurrency doesn’t physically go into the Ledger or the Ledger software correct?

Your Ledger is basically just a key, think of it as being a hardware-based password manager.

All the Ledger device does is hold that „password“.

Again, I’m using the word „password“ here loosely.

If you put your seed phrase into some type of app or software on your computer or on a telephone then that seed phrase and any accounts attached to it have become compromised.

You would need to make sure you have that original seed phrase still, you would need to reset the Ledger device and start all over and create a new seed phrase so that you can create wallet addresses.

Then after you create that new seed phrase and those new wallet addresses, you have to log back into the old one and transfer your coins from one account to the other.

If all you did was enter the pin number wrong three times so that the device reset and then created a new passphrase, all of your coins are still in the old account which means if the hacker has your old seed phrase they can still steal your money.

[ZiraDev]

Up

0

Down

::

OP before you make any „big move“ read the comments and answer for your sake.

Did you entered your seed phrase anywhere?

Resetting your Ledger is useless if then you use the same seed you compromised

[thedutchone13]

Up

0

Down

::

Hey Dude,

Maybe I’m wrong but think you may be confused. Your seed **IS** your wallet.

Your funds are in the wallet with the compromised seed and you need to move it out.

[Wallet 1] = Ledger [Old Seed]

[Wallet 2] = Ledger [New seed]

Whether you have keyed into your ledger the [old seed] or [new seed] the wallets still exists.

​

Based on my reading of the situation you have:

– compromised your [Wallet 1] by inputting [old seed] into phishing software. The bad actor has everything they need to empty your [Wallet 1] at any time.

– you have generated a [new seed] using your ledger and your ledger HW device currently contains this seed giving you access to [Wallet 2]. You have stored this [new seed] offline and have not input it anywhere.

– You have transferred 1k from [Wallet 1] to this [Wallet 2], as „bait“ thinking that the bad actor has access to [Wallet 2] (seem to be confused on how ledger device works). This is incorrect, they have access to [Wallet 1] because you disclosed your [Old seed] .

​

Move your funds out of [Wallet 1] immediately. Never use it again.

I would recommend reading the ledger provided information and lurking these forms. Feel free to ask questions on things that don’t make sense. Hopefully you move it in time…

[TillyDanger]

Up

0

Down

::

You need to transfer every asset tied to that seed, move it to an exchange. Reset the ledger with 3 incorrect pin attempts, then generate a new seed. Transfer assets from exchange back to the ledger with the new seed.

[loupiote2]

Up

0

Down

::

All the funds that were on accounts derived from the seed that you compromised (by entering it in a rogue app) are at risk (or already gone), unless you moved them to other accounts.

Funds deposited on accounts derived from your new seed (not compromised) are safe.

[Chipsanddip1234]

Up

0

Down

::

Sorry if I’m confusing . Ledger tech support advised to input 3 wrong pins. This generates a new seed that I’ve stored completely offline. Linked that new pinned ledger to ledger live. I believe I’m good now.

My 1st pin was comprised because inputted into the Microsoft App Store ledger live down. It asked for your seed and inputted that seed :/… my fault.

[greenglobones]

Up

0

Down

::

Make sure to generate new seed phrase after you reset your ledger.

[pvhbk]

Up

0

Down

::

Seed phrase isn’t the same as pin, changing your pin won’t help if you input your seed phrase somewhere online

[wildrabbitsurfer]

Up

0

Down

::

i think you need to full reset your phrase

[Chipsanddip1234]

Up

0

Down

::

Again sorry for the confusion. Yes I have a whole new seed phrase with new addresses . So it sounds like I’m good. I understand the technical way the ledger works. It was just getting over using a device that’s been comprised . The device is not the issue it’s the seed phrase that holds the key

[DOGEconomyman]

Up

0

Down

::

Make sure you can send OFF of the Ledger before going all in!

[TaterTots_Ledger]

Up

0

Down

::

If you’ve reset your device and generated a new recovery phrase and nobody (and no program) knows your pin or can get access to your recovery phrase, then accounts derived from that phrase are secure.

[Autor]

Beiträge