Unpopuläre Meinung: Hören Sie auf, die Passphrase-Funktion in den Kommentaren zu empfehlen.
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Ich sehe hier viele Kommentatoren, die neuen Nutzern empfehlen, die Passphrase-Funktion zu verwenden, um physische Seed-Extraktion und $5-Wrench-Angriffe zu entschärfen. Ich persönlich glaube, dass das Risiko, dass neue Benutzer (und sogar sehr erfahrene Benutzer) sich selbst aus ihren Passphrase-Wallets aussperren, das Risiko der physischen Seed-Extraktion und $5-Wrench-Angriffe bei weitem übersteigt.
Ich denke, dass die Passphrase-Funktion nur in extremen Fällen verwendet werden sollte, oder?
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I think it is important for new people to know what possibilities they have and then they can decide how hard they want to go. Everyone is going to weigh security and convenience differently. For me using the passphrase doesn’t really create enough inconvenience not to use it and does add some extra peace of mind. Also if you memorize your passphrase and also store it in a different location than your seed you should have nothing to worry about.
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> thoughts?
Totally agree on all counts, but all I can control is me. Reasons why I endorse your thoughts on this.
## Difficulty of the decrypt
First off, the NAND (memory) is no longer ***EASY*** to decrypt. Truth is, it never was. All the demos on this are very selective in the approach. NONE use firmware from 2023, and they all base the attacks on 4 digit PINs. And none of them account for users enabling more advanced NAND encryption with the SD-card.
## PINs neutralize the attack
Longer PINs also neutralizes this attack. And NO, cracking a 10 digit PIN is NOT trivial (*sigh*). The NAND uses ChaCha encryption making it VERY slow to decrypt and test. There is no way to test a brute-force attempt without decrypting the entire 1.5 MB of memory. Even when run in parallel the cost in hardware and memory to crack a 10 digit PIN in a few months is much more substantial than people make it out to be. If you want to be particularly evil put a sticker on the back with a PIN “3141” on the back. Link that PIN to your NAND wipe PIN. Problem solved, most attackers would enter the PIN, thinking you an idiot and wipe the device.
## SD-card neutralizes the attack
Why every Trezor-T user is not enabling `sd-protect` frankly astounds me. It is far and away the simplest measure that offers the greatest protection. Once enabled, the SD-card serves as a 2FA keyfile. Only the SD can unlock the device. If you remove the SD the device is completely useless. There is nothing an attacker could do, even if they completely copy the encrypted NAND. If you want to be particularly evil, swap your SD-protect card with your [SD-flash card](https://www.reddit.com/r/TREZOR/comments/13umfly/hyper_paranoid_trezort_autowipe_method/) so that anyone powering it up will automatically wipe the device.
## Difficulty of the glitch
The original attack used the firmware flash fingerprint check screen as the area where they tried to glitch STM32. The glitch requires an extremely narrow window, and complete walkthroughs I’ve seen (all using old firmware) took months to hit it. MONTHS!! Most click-bait writeups talk about the simplicity if the decrypt, and gloss over how LONG it took them to glitch the part. Later firmware removed the fingerprint verification so attackers would be lucky to be able to hit this in mere months.
## Conclusion
I get it, it’s scary and people just want to know that everything is safe. Yes, passphrase can help, so can multisig, as well as exotic custom spend scripts. Problem is each of these layers make it harder for the authorized user to touch the coins as well. The odds of getting your Trezor stolen are low. The odds of it getting stolen by an embedded firmware hacker are lower. The odds of it getting stolen by an embedded firmware hacker who cracks the nand before you notice it is missing are… frankly, astronomical. And if that doesn’t quell your paranoia, consider countermeasures, but passphrase would be the LAST of my countermeasures, not the first.
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To make it short;
Hm, no, you are wrong, passphrases are extremely important and remove much much much more risk than the risk it creates to only keep a seed, especially a 12 words seed only.
Anyone understanding the importance to keep the same seed written on paper at separate places, is smart enough to understand the importance of a passphrase, and how easy it is to create one, remember it forever, and understand that it creates a new set of keys.
My 70yo parents understood in 5 minutes the importance of a seed, and that a “last long enough word protects the 12/24 words in case somebody finds the paper sheet”.
A passphrase unfortunately doesn’t prevent from 5$ wrench attacks, but multisig & shamir do.
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Hard disagree on this one.
Passphrase wallets are hidden, you can have endless dummy wallets if you insist on living a flashy life flaunting your coins and worry about wrench attacks, and if you have poor memory, there’s endless ways to save your passphrases in a chain linked hint format (in a way only you will understand) in the event you forget it.
If you just have your keys w/ no passwords, you’re fucked with a catastrophic total loss if someone gets those keys. The bitcoin ceo has no sympathy for incompetent self custody and won’t refund your money, it’s up to the holder to take ownership responsibility on how he custodies.
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OP, I 100% understand what you’re saying and why. I know people of all ages who I would not trust to maintatain their keys for any length of time if you added the tiniest bit of complexity to a system they probably already don’t understand.
However, expect the online BTC community to downvote us to oblivion.
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100% ABSOLUTELY WRONG
I very strongly feel EVERYONE should use very secure passphrases
Really, they should not be optional.
Never digitise your Seed Recovery information, except to a trusted hardware wallet or other dedicated airgapped device. Certainly **never on anything capable of** connecting to the internet.
Etched onto steel plates, stored in multiple secure locations far from home, secure passphrase separately from 24-word mnemonic.
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This is not only an onpopulair but also a stupid opinion… People need to record and store their seedphrase securely already anyhow, adding the passphrase to this (record and store, ideally in a different location) is trivial, but adds a significant boost in security.
Your next of kin can be given the location of both, in a will (or a timed email) so that if something happens to you, they can still access it.
If you truly want to go the extra step, ensure that there is also a decoy wallet without a passphrase with a few hundred bucks.
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