Web3 Sicherheit: Die Frage nach der Geldbörse
- Dieses Thema hat 4 Antworten und 1 Teilnehmer, und wurde zuletzt aktualisiert vor 1 Woche, 6 Tage von
.
-
Beiträge
-
-
Ich bin besorgt über die Schwachstellen, die Web3-Aktivitäten für mein digitales Vermögen darstellen. Wird bei der Entleerung von Geldbörsen nur die verbundene Adresse entleert, oder auch jede andere Adresse innerhalb der Seed-Phrase-Wallet?
Gibt es einen empfohlenen Ansatz zur Minimierung der Gefährdung durch Wallet Draining Events?
Wäre zum Beispiel die folgende Wallet-Organisation eine gute Idee?
– **Ledger Hardware-Gerät #1**: **nurHODL**, keine Web3-Aktivitäten
– **Ledger-Hardware-Gerät #2** (verbunden mit Metamask / Phantom): **Nur Web3**
– NFT-Prägung
– NFT-Verkauf
– Web3 Website-Konten
– NFT Domainspeicherung und -verwaltungOder sollte ich zur Sicherheit die Web3-Aktivitäten in zwei getrennte Wallets aufteilen, so dass sich folgende Wallet-Organisation ergibt?
– **Ledger-Hardware-Gerät #1**: **nurHODL**, keine Web3-Aktivitäten
– **Ledger-Hardware-Gerät #2** (verbunden mit Metamask / Phantom): **Nur Web3**
– NFT-Prägung
– NFT-Verkauf
– **Ledger-Hardware-Gerät #3** (verbunden mit Metamask / Phantom): **Nur Web3**
– Web3 Website Kontoanmeldungen
– NFT-Domain-Speicherung und -Verwaltung -
> In wallet draining events, is the connected address the only thing that gets drained, or is it also every other address within that seed phrase wallet?
Generally the former. I don’t know enough to say that the latter *couldn’t* happen, but I think it’s likely not feasible for an attacker. Between distinct Ethereum “Accounts”, it should be impossible * for one to expose the others, and the same with other distinct cryptocurrencies (unless your seed gets leaked). My only uncertainty is because not all derived paths use the hardened approach as you go through addresses, though I do know that Ethereum Accounts do.
* Technically impossible. But keep in mind you could always be *tricked* into signing for a different account than the one you think you are signing for. For total security, isolating between distinct wallets does protect you there.
> Is there a recommended approach to minimizing exposure to wallet draining events?
Never connect anything to a wallet where you aren’t willing to lose all the value of it, IMO. Never sign use a hardware wallet anything you don’t fully understand, and never keep significant value stored anywhere except a hardware wallet.
> Ledger hardware device #2 (Connected to Metamask / Phantom): Web3 only
If this isn’t very valuable, you could just put play money levels of funds into metamask directly skipping the hardware wallet.
> Ledger hardware device #3
> Ledger hardware device #1: HODL onlyIf you’re going to take this approach, you should consider using BIP-85 derived seed phrases. You could store a single set of seed words and use that seed word to generate as many independent seeds as you like to use with each individual device/coin/whatever. Coldcard supports the generation of these derived seeds directly on-device with no updates or extra software needed at all, with or without a passphrase (25th word). In addition, each derived seed can have its own passphrase as well. Note this is a complicated setup, so if you do something like this, you need to document for your family carefully because if something happens to you, they’ll likely never figure out how to find your coins.
-
Actually, it is sufficient to just do any risky web3 activity from a different account, so no need to have multiple ledger device.
For example, I create a separate ETH account that I use for all my risky web3 activities, including NFTs. This way only this account it put at risk. Other accounts are completely immune, even if I sign malicious contracts from my “at-risk” account.
You could of course create multiple “at-risk” accounts, for various at-risk activities.
If you are overly paranoid, you could also use various bip39 passphrases to segregate those accounts on different seeds (under the same 24-word seed phrase), still using one ledger device.
It is completely un-necessary to use multiple ledgers in the cases that you describe.
-
You don’t need seperate devices. You can create an infinite number of accounts from a single device. However yes using separate accounts is a good idea. Even for hot wallet activities I have one address/account which is the hotest wallet which handles swaps and one off txs. Anything staked or lent however is on another account/address.
So for me it is more like:
* Ledger Account 1 – cold storage, zero approvals for anything
* Ledger Account 2 – hot wallet
* Ledger Account 3 – primary vault (maker dao)
* Ledger Account 4 – defi lendingAccount 2 is the one that is the most at risk and as such other than $50 worth of gas money it never has anything in it except what is going be swapped/bridged. I would point out that the 99% cheaper gas fees on L2 like arbitrum make this kind of compartmentalization a lot more viable. When transfers between accounts cost $0.02 and not $8 it is easy to do things right.
>In wallet draining events, is the connected address the only thing that gets drained, or is it also every other address within that seed phrase wallet?
The only way multiple addresses/accounts get drained is if you leak the seed phrase to the attacker. If you do the following that is essentially impossible
1) seed phrase written only in analog form paper/metal. Zero exceptions.
2) seed phrase stored in a secure location like a safe. It should always be behind some sort of lock when not being used to restore a ledger device. Zero exceptions.
3) seed phrase is only entered directly into the ledger device never into an website or application. Zero exceptions. -
-
- Du musst angemeldet sein, um auf dieses Thema antworten zu können.
